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I. INTRODUCTION
In the exercise of their legislative powers, lawmakers have the
power to enact statutory and regulatory schemes that anticipate
adjudication of disputes arising between governmental agencies and
those affected by regulatory controls. When the state legislators
determine, for example, that a commercial motor vehicle driver
(CDL) whose blood alcohol level (BAC) exceeds .04 percent must
lose his or her license for a year, traditional notions of due process
require the driver be permitted to contest the facts and law that would
lead to license revocation. In fashioning a legislative scheme that
meets due process requirements, lawmakers must decide how
disputes between government and the governed will be resolved.
Two adjudicative structures are available in these schemes: disputes
may be presented to the administrative body for review through an
administrative hearing before an adjudicator of the executive branch
(for example, an administrative law judge (AU)), or they may be
presented to a judge of the judicial branch of government.
Whether an AU or a judge of the judicial branch, whoever holds
the power to make the initial findings of fact and law possesses
substantial discretion and authority. Allocation of that power through
legislative delegation should be made only by lawmakers who
understand the significant differences between executive and judicial
branch adjudicative process. When creating a statutory scheme for
the protection of the public, lawmakers should be well informed
about the consequences of relying on the adjudication process of
either the judicial branch or the executive branch. The CDL
operator, for example, facing the license loss based on operating a
commercial vehicle with a .04 BAC, will demand adequate
procedural controls to ensure a fair outcome. The public who shares
the road with this driver, along with interest groups such as Mothers
Against Drunk Driving, will insist that the process effectively carry
out the intended protections of public health and safety. When
choosing an adjudicative process, lawmakers should recognize the
relative strengths and weaknesses of these two judicial forums. This
choice will become particularly significant as federal and state
lawmakers create new programs for the protection of the public
pursuant to the mandate of the USA Patriot Act and the programs to
be administered through the Department of Homeland Security.
A core component of any adjudicative approach is the decision.
23-2
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Whether rendered orally from the bench at the time parties appear
before a judge, or presented through written judicial opinions, or
offered in the form of the highly structured writing required by most
state administrative procedure acts, the decision represents a standard
through which our government presents its proof that justice has been
done through a fair and effective adjudication. Done well, the
decision inspires trust and confidence in the legislative and
regulatory schemes, and in our government's commitment to due
process. Poorly presented, or produced through an inefficient or
sloppy process, the decision can cast doubt on the integrity of the
legislative and regulatory schemes and invites disrespect for the law,
eroding the structure and purpose that led to the law in the first place.
The claim central to this analysis is that there are significant
differences that must be recognized when determining who should
render an initial decision in any legislative or regulatory scheme.
When making the choice between the executive branch and judicial
branch adjudicator, lawmakers must recognize the importance of the
differences in the use of language by the executive branch and
judicial branch adjudicators. The two adjudicators do not use
language in the same way, and the differences in their use of
language can be exploited, if properly understood and mastered, to
exponentially increase the likelihood of success of a given statute or
regulation. Otherwise, left unattended or ignored, language and its
diverse use by the executive or judicial branch adjudicator can bring
down even the soundest legislative initiative.
Within this central claim are three subordinate claims, each
focusing on one of the core components of adjudication: First, there
is a material difference between decisions rendered in writing and
those announced at the time evidence is presented (i.e., bench
decisions). Second, the audience matters: it makes a difference
whether the decision is directed to the parties (as is the case in
judicial branch decisions) or to an executive branch decision maker
(as is the case in most administrative adjudications). Third,
institutional control over the decision maker must be taken into
account when determining which adjudicative path a given legislative
scheme should follow. Common to each of these sub-theses is the
recognition that language and the law are intimately, perhaps
inextricably, intertwined. Judges of all stripes are blessed (or cursed)
with society's expectation that they will articulate the boundaries
between the government and the governed, and will give meaning to
F II 2flfl
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cherished yet ephemeral notions of fundamental fairness and due
process.
II. CRITICAL FACTORS OF ADJUDICATION: LANGUAGE AND THE
ADJUDICATION PROCESS IN EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL BRANCH
DECISIONS
A. The Role of Decisionmaking in Adjudication
1. Decisionmaking in the Context of Adjudication
Reduced to essentials, adjudication consists of the presentation of
claims or a demand for relief, the presentation of evidence creating a
record, adjudicative analysis, and publication of the decision, either
orally or in writing. The decision consists of a holding, announcing
who won supported by an analysis, through which the adjudicator
resolves any disputed factual claims, and applies those facts to law.
The decision represents an ending of sorts: its function is to reveal
how the adjudicator resolved controverted points of fact and law to
reach the holding. It need follow no particular structure: a judge
could render a decision from the bench immediately after the
presentation of evidence, or adjourn to reflect upon the exhibits and
transcripts prior to rendering a decision. The decision also is a mid-
point, serving as a launching place for appellate review. Viewed
thus, the decision is the source a superior judicial tribunal will turn to
most heavily when determining the sufficiency of the decision-
making process of the lower tribunal.
The decision typically will be in writing, although it is also
common to find the adjudicative process brought to a conclusion
without a formal written entry. What distinguishes the decision from
other parts of the adjudicative process is its terminal effect: once
offered by the adjudicator, the decision is intended to bring to an end
the gathering and evaluation of facts, and it is designed to announce
the rationale which applies those facts to the controlling law, leading
to the final orders of the case, save for any appeal that may be taken.
These core components of a decision exist whether the
adjudicator is a judge of the judicial branch or an executive branch
adjudicator. Parenthetically, for these purposes the executive branch
adjudicator includes administrative law judges, hearing examiners,
hearing officers, and any operative of the government who possesses
C'ritie21 F7awtnr of Adiudication
judicial power through a legislative delegation of those powers to the
executive branch. Generically and for the purposes of this article, we
can refer to these adjudicators as administrative law judges or ALs,
although in many jurisdictions the term "judge" must be limited to
those who draw their authority from the judicial branch of
government. In Ohio, for example, executive-branch adjudicators are
by statute referred to as administrative hearing examiners, and may
not present themselves as judges.1 In the disposition and resolution
of claims, the judicial branch judge and the ALJ share the obligation
to draw from competing claims and conflicting evidence a coherent
presentation of the evidence. Upon that presentation, the adjudicator
must render a decision that answers the questions posed by the
parties, in a manner that lends itself to public inspection and appellate
review.
2. Distinguishing the Decisionmaking Roles of the AU and the
Judicial Branch Judge
The executive branch adjudicator is known by the limits on her or
his authority. The ALJ possesses only those powers diverted from
the judicial branch through the process of legislative delegation. In
crafting a decision, the AU knows that only the judicial branch judge
has been given the powers of true judicial authority. Generally, ALJs
may not find a statute or regulation is unconstitutional, whereas a
court of general jurisdiction is given that power of legislative
oversight. ALJs typically lack the ability to enforce their decision
through contempt; indeed, enforcement power, where it exists at all,
is almost always indirect, its effect dependent upon the plenary
powers of judicial-branch process. Further, ALJs typically lack the
rights of tenure like those guaranteed under article III of the United
States Constitution. Their duties, however, are "functionally
comparable" to those of a judge of the judicial branch, and the
"process of agency adjudication is currently structured so as to assure
that the hearing examiner exercises his independent judgment on the
evidence before him, free from pressures by the parties or other
officials within the agency." 2 Thus, the ALJ uses the tools of the
1. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 119.09 (Anderson 2002).
2. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978).
r ll " Illfi "1
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article III judge and is entitled to some measure of independence
from agency influence, but lacks the structural protection that
characterizes judicial power under the Constitution.
3. The Use of Language in the Decisionmaking Process
To be effective, a judicial or administrative decision needs to
accomplish two goals: it must report the adjudicator's decision and
set forth the reasons justifying that decision. The decision should
disclose the events that gave rise to the legal controversy, the
intermediate steps that preceded the decision, the nature of any
controverted facts, the rationale that resolved those factual
controversies (including resolutions based on credibility
determinations made by the adjudicator), and the application of law
to the facts so resolved.4
To be effective, the language used in the decision-making process
must take into account the needs and expectations of the target
audience. In the course of judicial adjudications, that audience is,
first and foremost, the parties to the action. Whether ruling from the
bench shortly after conducting a driving under the influence (DUI)
trial, for example, or ruling through a written decision granting a
motion for summary judgment, a trial court must craft a decision
using language that will inform the parties of how it resolved all
material facts and how those facts were applied to the law. An ALJ,
on the other hand, will need to use language to suit not only the
parties to the action but also the agency through which the ALJ is
acting. This is a significant difference, because it represents a
procedural step not imposed upon a judge of the judicial branch. In
those cases where the decision of the AL is not the final agency
order but is instead a recommendation that may be accepted,
modified, or rejected by the agency head, the decision must be
crafted in a way that lends itself to such a process of review by the
agency, before an appeal is taken to a judicial-branch appellate court.
The AU's use of language must take into account the demands of
the agency and must abide by conventions imposed upon the AU
3. Sylvan Barnet & Hugo Bedau, Current Issues and Enduring Questions, in
A Lawyer's View: Steps Toward Civic Literacy 382 (Bedford St. Martin's 2002).
4. Id. at 386.
through the agency or the agency's proxy in those cases where the
AL is directed by an entity other than the agency itself.5 Even in
those cases where the ALl's decision constitutes the final agency
order, the AL must express his or her findings and conclusions in a
way that discloses, not only to the parties but also to the agency, the
rationale supporting the decision.
B. The Use of Language to Set Boundaries in the Adjudicative
Process
In his seminal research on the use of language in judicial
proceedings, William O'Barr described the work of the Law and
Language Project at Duke University, which he and others performed
between 1974 and 1982. The project examined two propositions:
"(1) Linguistic variation in any setting is not random, but socially
patterned; and (2) sets of rules of successful strategies and tactics
exist for competitive arenas of all sorts, including trial courtrooms."
6
Through direct observation and study in a North Carolina courtroom,
the author and his associates studied the use of language, primarily
spoken but also written, over a ten-week period. Serendipitously, the
research author was also summoned to jury service in the courtroom
during this period, giving him an uncommonly close view of the use
of language by jurors, over the course of two cases, both involving
appeals of traffic violations.
7
As a starting point, O'Barr confirms what lawyers and judges
have long known; the form of language makes a difference and the
difference can be significant in a judicial setting.
8
The initial working proposition is that form is, at the
very least, one important component of the total
message and its reception. I intend to demonstrate that
form may at times be highly significant, even to the
point where a change in form can alter or reverse the
5. For example, in states having a centralized corps of ALJs who are not
directly controlled by the agency.
6. William M. O'Barr, Linguistic Evidence - Language, Power and Strategy
in the Courtroom (Academic Press 1982).
7. Id. at 58.
8. Id. at 2.
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impact of a message. The arena chosen for
investigating this proposition is the trial courtroom....
What makes the court especially interesting is that
language strategy is generally recognized by
participants, although poorly understood by them.
Investigating communication in the courtroom is
simultaneously an opportunity to investigate the
importance of form and to seek insight into the role of
language in the legal process.9
While O'Barr's research was in the courtroom of a trial court, the
points raised apply with equal vigor to the administrative forum.
Adjudications conducted by the executive branch, like those of the
judicial branch, rely on conventions of language and process. In an
administrative license suspension hearing based on a .04 BAC, the
commercial truck driver does not face a jail sentence as she would if
she were before a trial court on a charge of DUI. Even so, all the
parties expect the proceedings to be adversarial, and will require the
court to control the gathering of evidence in a manner that protects
the guaranteed constitutional rights of the driver. Generally, the
administrative process is used when the government seeks to
withdraw a license or deny a benefit. That being said, however,
society recognizes the significant impact of the loss of an
occupational license, and in turn invests the AU with powers and
responsibilities very much like those attributed to the judicial branch
courts. To the extent that the use of language facilitates or acts as a
barrier to a fair trial in the DUI proceeding, it likewise will have an
impact on the adversarial proceedings created to ensure fairness for
the CDL operator facing an administrative license revocation.
1. The Role of Syntax, Grammar, and Colloquial Expression in
Adjudication
Examining the adjudicative process from the linguist's
perspective, O'Barr recognizes the effect of two types of rules:
normative rules, which "reflect the public face of politics and carry
strong moral valu[es]," and pragmatic rules, "the private wisdom of
9. Id.
political success" not nearly so publicly acknowledged but essential
to successful strategy in the courtroom.10 Lawyers are familiar with
both. Lawyers follow the Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules of
Evidence, and other well-publicized normative rules that guide the
court and the parties through the adjudication process. Lawyers also
privately consult practitioner's manuals for effective strategies, tips,
and checklists for trial practice. Hearsay offers a good example of
both the normative and pragmatic rule.11 A number of evidence rules
define when an out of court statement is or is not hearsay, and further
permit or exclude statements that are hearsay based upon a collective
historical experience reflecting the relative reliability of such
evidence. 12 However, these normative rules do not operate in a
vacuum: lawyers simultaneously consider pragmatic rules, taught
through experience and the culture of litigation, when they consider
the merits of offering evidence even though the offer likely violates
one or more of the normative rules.
Although they are not found in any treatises on
procedure, successful lawyers know many such rules.
For example, it may be worthwhile to introduce
evidence while knowing that it will be objected to and
ruled inadmissible. Doing so may be strategically
useful IN ORDER TO BRING SUCH INFORMATION TO THE
ATTENTION OF THE JURY. Even though instructed to
forget inadmissible evidence, lawyers know that jurors
cannot and do not in fact do so. Moreover, objections
of the opposition may only serve to call more attention
to the material. Such are pragmatic rules of courtroom
procedure. 13
Viewed from the linguist's perspective, adjudications in
administrative proceedings share many attributes found in trials
before a judicial tribunal, with one notable exception, the absence of
juries. Given the absence of jurors, the pragmatic rules O'Barr refers
10. Id. at 5.
11. Id. at 5-6.
12. Id. at 6; See e.g. FED R. EvID. 803.
13. Id.
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to are likely to shift away from addressing the needs of lay jurors in
favor of attending to the sensibilities of the ALJ. This shift, from
meeting the needs of jurors to meeting the expectations of ALJs,
carries with it both a burden and a benefit, both of which can be
drawn from a truncated review of characteristics of language and the
law.
In his study of the language of the law, David Mellinkoff offers a
systematic examination of the language lawyers use. 14 From a list of
nine attributes of legal language identified by Mellinkoff, four
attributes have particular significance when examining the use of
language in decision-making. These four attributes are:
* COMMON WORDS WITH SPECIALIZED LEGAL MEANINGS[:]
action for 'law suit', instrument, for 'legal document', of
course for 'as a matter of right', serve for 'deliver legal
papers', etc....
* TERMS OF ART[:] contributory negligence, eminent domain,
garnishment, judicial notice injunction, negotiable
instrument, prayer, stare decisis, etc....
" WORDS WITH FLEXIBLE MEANINGS[:] adequate,
approximately, clean and neat condition, extreme cruelty,
obscene, promptly, satisfy, undue influence, worthless, etc.
* ATTEMPTS AT EXTREME PRECISION[:] absolutes such as all,
none, irrevocable, never; restrictions such as and no more,
and no other purpose, shall not constitute a waiver;
unlimiting phrases such as including but not limited to, shall
not be deemed to limit, nothing contained herein shall; etc. 15
When examining the use of language in decisions by any kind of
adjudicator, each of these attributes warrants attention. Lawyers who
are familiar with an agency's procedures will know, for example, that
common words with specialized meanings will have different
meanings depending on whether the forum is a judicial branch court
14. David Mellinkoff, The Language of the Law (Boston, Little, Brown 1963)
cited in O'Barr, supra note 6 at 15-20.
15. O'Barr, supra note 6, at 16-17 (quoting Mellinkoff, supra note 14, at 11-
29) (emphasis added in bold) (bullet points added). Terms of art are "[tiechnical
words and phrases whose meanings are seldom disputed in the law." O'Barr, supra
note 6, at 17 n. 1.
or an administrative proceeding. A "hearing" in court will likely be
something less than the entire evidentiary process; whereas the same
term in the context of an agency proceeding is likely to be the one
and only opportunity for the presentation of evidence. Similarly,
terms of art and words having flexible meanings, developed in courts
of general jurisdiction, often evolve over long periods of time. In
contrast, the rulemaking process permits an agency to codify and
thereby greatly shorten the time needed to turn words having a
generally accepted "street" meaning into terms of art. Given the
more specialized nature of agency proceedings, the tendency towards
such specialized use of words is both understandable and
unavoidable. Any attorney seeking to operate in an administrative
forum is thus obligated to seek out and master the lexicon of the
agency and its adjudicative forum.
2. Codes and Specialized Language
One characteristic of the use of language reported on by O'Barr is
the use of specialized language by attorneys, most notably when
addressing the finder of fact - typically the jury. These special forms
of communication, all spoken, appear to meet specific needs of the
jury: (1) formal legal language, like that used by a judge when
instructing the jury or used by the lawyers when making motions to
the court; (2) standard English, generally labeled as "correct" English
and akin to what is taught as the standard in American classrooms;
(3) colloquial English, matching more closely everyday, ordinary
English in lexicon and syntax and lacking many of the formalities
found in standard English; and (4) subcultural English, which O'Barr
describes as "language spoken by segments of the society who differ
in speech style and mannerisms from the larger community; in the
case of the particular courts studied in North Carolina, these varieties
include Black English and the dialect of English spoken by poorly
educated whites."' 1
6
A lawyer's skill in her use of such language varieties is a
benchmark for professional success in court. Colloquial English may
be used, for example, when introducing a cause to the jury, in an
attempt to "emulate the speech styles of 'ordinary folks"' and
16. O'Barr, supra note 6, at 25.
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engender a measure of trust between the lawyer and members of the
jury. 17 The lawyer may then change her style when dealing with
hostile expert witnesses to emphasize differences in the use of
language that would serve as a barrier between the expert and the
jury. 18
In administrative proceedings, where there is no jury to cater to,
both the AU and the participants can anticipate a less diverse and
more predictable fact-finder; at least with the AU-driven
administrative forum, there is only one fact-finder, reducing the need
to appeal to the syntactical sensibilities of six to twelve lay jurors.
Furthermore, agency proceedings characteristically involve a
relatively narrow and specialized subject area, inviting a more precise
and carefully crafted exchange among the parties during the
gathering of evidence. When compared to judicial proceedings,
administrative hearings offer the potential for a hearing that is
briefer, more clearly presented, and less likely to be influenced by
distractions like colloquial expression designed to pander to the
interests of local jurors.
3. Inclusion and Exclusion in Adjudications
Two of the significant differences between the decisions rendered
by ALJs and those rendered by courts of the judicial branch are, first,
the power to require a written decision by the AU, and second, the
ability to control what is included and excluded from the written
product. In contrast, the judicial branch adjudicator may dispose of
cases with little more than an announcement from the bench,
followed by a pro forma entry showing nothing more than the name
of the prevailing party. The court need offer neither oral nor written
explanation for its decision, and can leave to the parties the task of
journalizing the outcome of the case.
As a product of the legislative delegation of authority, the
administrative forum can be created so as to require a written
decision in every instance where a final order is produced.
Furthermore, state administrative procedure acts (i.e., the codification
of procedural rules and standards by which the AU operates an
17. Id. at 25-26.
18. Id.
adjudicative forum) will typically mandate a format for such
decisions, requiring separate sections reporting factual findings, legal
conclusions, an analysis, and a recommendation. Either by broad
legislation affecting all agency decisions or through more narrow
regulations tailored for specific agencies, lawmakers and executive
officers can insist on a transparent written product that sets forth the
controlling facts and law. There is no comparable power in either the
legislative or executive branches of government, by which courts of
the judicial branch may be compelled to expose their rationale or
decision-making process. While it is true that many judicial-branch
courts operate under a set of formal rules controlling the decision-
making process, the source for such rules is typically the judicial
branch, itself, acting through the highest court of the state and not the
legislative or executive branch.
This legislative power with respect to administrative
adjudications - the ability to impose minimum standards of
performance and require evaluation of the quality of the adjudicative
process - may be of particular significance when lawmakers seek to
implement new regulations or seek more effective enforcement of
existing laws. Consider, for example, the process when a state seeks
to enforce DUI laws that include an administrative license revocation
for all drivers who either fail or refuse to submit to a roadside
sobriety test. The DUI law itself is criminal in nature, and
adjudications leading to a criminal conviction are the exclusive
domain of courts of the judicial branch. The administrative license
suspension or revocation proceeding, on the other hand, may be
delegated to the executive branch adjudicator. In doing so,
lawmakers may carefully circumscribe and limit the scope of what
may be included in the ALJ's report, and in doing so, lawmakers also
may limit the scope of what may be introduced during the evidentiary
hearing. In administrative license revocation proceedings in Georgia,
for example, the legislature has expressly limited the scope of the
administrative hearing in administrative license suspension cases to a
consideration of six factors (including whether the person refused the
test, whether the test had been properly administered, etc.).1 9 In this
way, the legislative branch can give clear and effective direction to
the executive branch adjudicator, narrowly defining the scope of
19. GA. CODE ANN. § 40-5-67.1(g)(2)(A)-(F) (2001).
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evidentiary proceedings, in a way that promises an efficient fact-
finding process while, at the same time, satisfying all constitutional
requirements including the requirement of due process.
C. Structural Controls Over the Adjudicative Process
If one accepts as true the proposition that lawmakers have the
ability to control the decision-making process to some extent by
electing to use executive branch adjudicators instead of judges of the
judicial branch, then the next logical question concerns the limits on
this ability. Not all adjudications, of course, can be presented to the
executive branch. Administrative law has developed in such a way
as to suggest that administrative adjudications will generally be
limited to the review of government-based licensing and entitlement
decisions. The short version of this doctrine is that if the government
bestowed a benefit or license and seeks to alter it (or deny it in the
first instance), then it makes sense to permit the executive branch of
government to have the first opportunity to consider claims
challenging the government's decision.
A fundamental principle limiting lawmakers in the creation of
administrative adjudicative bodies is that generally the legislative
branch may not confer Article III judicial power on an adjudicator of
the executive branch. 20 A more thorough discussion on this point
would be beyond the scope of the topic, but it should suffice for these
purposes to state that agency adjudication generally can replace
adjudication by a judicial branch court when "public rights" are
involved as the Supreme Court explained in one case: "[W]hen
Congress creates new statutory 'public rights,' it may assign their
adjudication to an administrative agency with which a jury trial
would be incompatible..." 21 Assuming, then, that the statutory or
regulatory scheme is one well suited for adjudication in either the
judicial branch or executive branch forum, the discussion next should
consider requirements relative to both forums.
20. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982).
21. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n,
430 U.S. 442, 454 (1977), quoted in Richard J. Pierce, Jr., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE 125 (4th ed. 2002).
1. The Need for Judicial Independence in the Deliberative and
Writing Processes
When crafting a decision based upon an adversarial proceeding,
an adjudicator - whether judicial or executive - must be free to do so
in a manner that both is fair and appears to be fair. The need for
independence in the deliberative and writing process is reflected in
due process jurisprudence, a fact that should signal the need for some
further explanation and definition. This is so because due process is
not a fixed concept, but is instead expressed in terms of relativity:
process that is due in some instances surpasses that which is due in
others.22 Applied here, the degree of independence called for in the
decision-making process in some cases, particularly those wholly
within the province of the judicial branch, is substantially greater
than the measure of independence called for in others.
At issue, and providing the tension that sometimes arises between
the ALJ and the agency using the ALJ, are the conflicting interests of
independent decision-making sought by the AU and the agency's
interest in consistent and prompt adjudication. As Professor Pierce
describes it:
Like federal judges, ALJs enjoy a high degree of
independence from the agencies in which they
adjudicate disputes. Their resulting insulation from
policymakers and the political forces that constantly
buffet an agency furthers the due process value of
ensuring adjudication by unbiased, neutral decision-
makers. The concept of due process, or fundamental
fairness, embodies more than one value, however.
Most people, including most or all Supreme Court
Justices, recognize at least two other important values
under the general heading 'fundamental fairness.' An
individual is entitled to prompt adjudication of a
dispute involving her interests in "life, liberty, or
22. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (articulating a three-
part balancing test to determine due process minima); see e.g., Van Harken v. City
of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1351 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying the test in Mathews
using a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether due process rights were violated
in city parking ticket adjudications).
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property." An individual also is entitled to have her
case resolved in a manner consistent with the
resolution of cases involving similarly situated
individuals. Consistency in resolution of adjudicatory
disputes is an important due process value. If all
individuals in a large class are judged by the same
standard, the risk that the government will arbitrarily
single out an individual for harsh treatment
disappears. 2
3
The ability of the government to maintain a process of
adjudication that provides for timely and consistent decisions is a key
factor in deciding to use executive rather than judicial branch
decision-makers. Once it puts into place an unbiased decision maker,
the legislature should have some confidence that the process will
result in consistent decisions rendered in a prompt fashion. By the
same token, lawmakers should also have some degree of confidence
that the executive branch adjudicator will be properly trained and
adequately supervised, so that the quality of the AL's decision-
making is consistently high. No comparable system of quality
control exists with respect to judges of the judicial branch; at least
not any emanating from either the executive branch or the legislative
branch. Judicial branch judges are accountable to the electorate in
those jurisdictions where judges are elected, and are subject to
impeachment, but otherwise are structurally and fundamentally
insulated against overreaching by the other branches of government.
2. Controls Over the Judicial Writer: Structural, Political, and
Practical
It should perhaps come as no surprise that judges of all stripes,
including ALJs, tend to regard controls over their writing and their
decision-making with great suspicion and oftentimes with deep
resentment. Some say it is better to permit the ALJ to write poorly,
ignore the law, and defy the agencies that use their services, than
permit the agencies to impose ex parte restrictions on the AL's
independence in the decision-making process. As one AU put it:
23. Pierce, supra note 21, at 691.
Ex parte input by the agency, also known as
subsequent review or approval, of the decision by the
agency prior to issuance is considered inappropriate
control of the decision-making process presenting a
false pretense of due process . . . . The zealously
independent administrative adjudicator believes he or
she should be free to be wrong, biased, inconsistent,
illogical, inarticulate, and incomplete. Furthermore,
these types of adjudicators believe that they should be
free to ignore facts, law, and policy.
To these adjudicators, errors or disagreements should
be resolved during an open agency appellate review
process, much as it is with 'real judges,' and not
through, what they see as, pre-issuance 'quality
control,' decisional interference.
24
Given the role language plays in decision-making, and given the
importance of effective communication in the decision (and, for that
matter, in the adjudication process as a whole), it seems particularly
important that lawmakers give some thought to the degree of control
that will be exercised over the use of language by executive branch
adjudicators.
3. Legislative Oversight of the Judicial Process Through Language
and Codes
When fashioning regulatory schemes, like the creation of an
administrative license revocation based upon the refusal to take
roadside field sobriety tests or refusal to blow into an alcohol breath
analyzer, lawmakers should be alert to the different philosophies
attendant to the role of the ALJ, particularly with respect to the
decision-making process. If the adjudicator appointed to carry out a
regulatory scheme envisions herself as invested with judicial power
like that of the judicial branch judge, then the results may include
24. Robert Robinson Gales, The Peer Review Process in Administrative
Adjudication, 21 J. NAAu 56, 57 (2001).
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some unintended and potentially counter-productive consequences.
An AU who construes her position as the functional equivalent of a
court of general jurisdiction, for example, may elect to disregard
agency interpretation of policy despite a clear and on-the-record
articulation of that policy during the evidentiary hearing. This may
lead to the creation of an adjudicator who is accountable to no one,
particularly where the AU's tenure is assured either through civil
service protection or the benefits of a collective bargaining
agreement. If the AU is not subject to performance evaluations like
those traditionally used to evaluate civil servants, then he or she will
operate without any real measure of accountability, at which point
due process - the participant's expectation in a result that is based on
consistent application of agency policy and law - is indeed
threatened.
The divergence of thought on this point has some of the
characteristics of a typical labor-management dispute, with one
philosophy (the AU judicial model of decision-making) railing
against the concept of quality control, and the countervailing
philosophy (the institutional model) seeking to ensure prompt and
consistent decision-making in furtherance of the legislative scheme.
Professor Asimow described these divergent views this way:
One struggle was between institutionalists and
judicialists. An institutionalist believes that the
primary function of administrative adjudication is to
formulate and apply public policy. The process for
producing an agency adjudicatory decision should
resemble a corporation's decision to produce a new
product. Decision makers should be free to talk to
anyone who can contribute; every member of the staff
should participate in making the decision in whatever
way seems appropriate; there should be no separation
of functions. An institutionalist is concerned with
producing accurate and consistent decisions quickly
and efficiently. The emphasis is on fitting each
decision into a wise application of regulatory policy.
Due process and judicial review, in this view, are
necessary evils.
A judicialist has a wholly different orientation. The
judicialist believes that the emphasis should be on
fairness and due process for the private party. The
model should be civil litigation in court. Adjudication
should apply existing policy, not make new policy
with retroactive application. There should be a rigid
separation between prosecution and judging, even if
this means the process is less efficient and may not
produce a decision that implements consistent agency
policy. Judicial review is essential and courts should
have broad powers.25
It would thus appear to be incumbent upon our legislators to
evaluate the relative benefits and costs associated with the use of
adjudicators who are part of the executive branch yet seek the
independence that otherwise is reserved for the judicial branch.
Underlying this issue is the question of accountability. If insulated
against removal from office by civil service protections or by the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement, and if appointed through
a process in which the public had no direct role, then the ALJ will be
largely unaccountable, and may engage in decision-making
unchecked by any branch of government. The due process goals of
providing a forum presided over by an impartial adjudicator would be
met in this case, but there would be no assurance that the other due
process requirements of a consistent and prompt process would exist.
D. Public Perception of the Adjudicative Process
In his research into the use of language in the adjudicative
process, O'Barr and his team examined the role of language and its
impact on the public. 26 Among the findings were discussions about
two dynamics frequently encountered in proceedings held in both
judicial and executive-branch adjudications. One of these was the
role of silence or the suppression of speech, and another was the use
of language in making credibility determinations. As
anthropologists, O'Barr and his team were particularly interested in
25. Michael Asimow, The Administrative Judiciary: ALJs in Historical
Perspective, 20 J. NAALJ 157, 160 (2000).
26. O'Barr, supra note 6.
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examining what O'Barr referred to as four specific styles of
courtroom speech: powerful versus powerless speech, narrative
versus fragmented history, hypercorrection, and simultaneous
speech.27 While O'Barr's findings generally go beyond the scope of
this analysis, there is cause to consider his analysis of the role of
silence and credibility determinations by the fact finder (either a jury
or the trial court judge in a bench trial). The public's perception of
these two phenomena, and the trial court's ability to control them
(and avoid being controlled by them), may be useful in describing
critical roles of language in the adjudicative process.
1. Interpretation, Exclusion, and Misperception Through the Use of
Language in Adjudication
An essential element of adjudication, according to O'Barr, is
interpretation:
Interpretation is central to the business of the court. A
court exists, among other purposes, to interpret the
issues that bring people before it. It resolves in the
verdict the multiple versions of the facts as reported
by witnesses. It decides in the end who wins,
overriding all individual opinions on the matter as
well as the contending positions of the two sides. In
doing this, the court interprets. Finally, lest anyone
not wish to abide by the official interpretation, the
court can command enforcement by the state of its
interpretation and all decisions subsequent to it (fines,
jail terms, monetary awards, and so on).
But this is not the only kind of interpretation that
occurs in court. In testifying, witnesses interpret.
They report recollections, and in doing so interpret the
past. Lawyers interpret at critical points in the trial:
Opening remarks and summations are interpretations -
suggested interpretations lawyers hope will be
accepted by the decision makers. The jury also
27. Id. at 61.
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interprets in rendering its verdict. It decides and
announces publicly which version, or suggested
interpretation, it accepts. Thus the trial process is in
effect a movement from multiple interpretations to a
single, officially sanctioned one.28
In this regard, AUs perform the same duties as the judicial
branch judge with respect to the facts presented. It is their common
task to interpret the testimony of witnesses and weigh the relative
persuasive power of competing factual allegations. Unlike the
judicial branch court, however, the AU is obliged to abide by the
interpretation of agency regulations, provided those interpretations
are made a part of the record. This is in contrast with the role of the
judicial branch adjudicator, whose duties include evaluation of the
constitutionality of statutory and regulatory enactments when called
upon by the parties to make such a determination.
One example of the role of interpretation is the role of the
adjudicator in response to silence. Consider O'Barr's observation
about silence:
Silence is not a style in the same sense as powerless
speech, fragmented testimony, or hypercorrection.
Yet it is like all of them. It too means something.
Why is one witness slow in responding? Why does
another not respond at all? Silence occasions these
kinds of questions, and they are similar ones to those
raised by other testimony styles ....
Although it may seem at times that fascination with
silence and how it works in court is the motivating
force, it will become clear that the real reason we
focus on it is to discover the complex ways in which
the court as an institution and the individuals who
make it up attempt to influence and manage the
meaning of silence. In many ways, it is a more
interesting case than any style of speaking per se - for
28. Id. at 97.
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in silence lies greater ambiguity and hence more
opportunity to manage its meaning. 29
In the administrative forum, where no jury is present, the
adjudicator can interpret silence with a measure of skill (like that of
the trial court, in a bench trial), beyond that of the ad hoc jury. When
the executive adjudicator engages in such an interpretation,
moreover, she must articulate having done so within a written report.
Although in some instances jurors may be obliged to render special
verdict findings, most of their work takes place in the confines of ajury deliberation room. Usually the nature of their deliberation is not
subject to the light of day except for the answer to the ultimate
question (e.g., a defendant's guilt or innocence). As O'Barr noted,jurors may well construe, however inappropriately, a criminal
defendant's decision not to testify as a sign of the defendant's guilt:
It is a further principle of American law that a
defendant's decision not to testify-to remain silent-
shall not create any presumption against the
defendant. Note that this principle concerns how
silence is to be interpreted. It cannot, for example, be
argued that a defendant's refusing to testify is an
admission that he or she has something to hide.
Rather, the burden is on the State to prove its case
without any assistance from a defendant who decides
not to testify. What private meanings may be
attached, for example, by jurors to the fact that a
defendant does not take the witness stand remain
unknown. It is probable, however, that some jurors
may -despite the warning of the court-consider the
fact that a defendant remains silent to be a negative
factor. 30
In contrast to the jury's secret deliberations, which give rise to the
probability identified by O'Barr, the AL's decision-making process
is patently expressed in their written report and recommendation. In
29. Id. at 98.
30. Id.
this way, the administrative forum offers an advantage over a jury
trial forum by providing more transparent and arguably fairer
decisions.
2. Credibility Determinations
As already noted, central to the decision-making process is the
act of interpretation. One of the fundamental tasks of the adjudicator
is to interpret conflicting testimony with respect to material facts, and
from the testimony make determinations based on the relative
credibility of the witnesses. If this process is transparent and appears
to be fair, the public's perception of the process will be favorable. If,
on the other hand, the finder of fact makes credibility determinations
that defy logic and common experience, and if the finder of fact is
then not required to reveal the bases for these determinations (as is
the case with jury determinations in criminal proceedings), then
public confidence in the adjudicative process will suffer.
O'Barr makes the point that credibility determinations are an
essential part of the decision-making process, and that such
determinations are made based on "demeanor evidence," including
"style, paralinguistic cues, and nonverbal behavior" in reaching a
decision about a witness's credibility.31  Given their advanced
education, familiarity with the subject matter, forensic ability, and
experience, ALJs can perform the required credibility determinations
with uncommon skill. And, provided that they make a written record
of having done so, the resulting interpretations will be affirmed.
O'Barr relates the case of an administrative hearing examiner
presiding over a case before the National Labor Relations Board in
which the hearing examiner expressed his belief in the testimony of
one party over that of another.32 The court of appeals, in affirming
the Board's order, noted the role of the agency adjudicator in making
credibility determinations: "Repeatedly, the courts have said that,
since observation of such 'demeanor evidence' is open to a trier of
the facts, when witnesses testify orally in his presence, and since
31. John M. Conley, The Law, appearing in William M. O'Barr, Linguistic
Evidence: Language, Power, and Strategy in the Courtroom 42 (Academic Press
1982).
32. Id.
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such observation is not open to a reviewing tribunal, the fact-trier's
findings, to the extent that they comprise direct or 'testimonial'
inferences, are ordinarily unreviewable. ' 33
Not only is it significant that the hearing examiner be given the
power to make testimonial inferences, O'Barr notes that once such an
interpretation is made, reviewing courts are ill-equipped to set those
decisions aside: "Thus, the hearing officer, as the trier of fact (the
jury analog), had a right to consider demeanor evidence. Since the
reviewing court had no opportunity to view the demeanor in
question, findings based on it would not be altered. ' 34  The
significance of this delegation of adjudicative authority is substantial,
in large part because the public has invested its faith in the AU to
make key assessments of credibility, based on all available linguistic
cues, cues that are beyond the reach of appellate courts (and thus are
not likely to be rejected on appeal). As O'Barr explains:
Demeanor evidence continues to be recognized by the
law as valid evidence. But because of the very nature
of such evidence, it is all but impossible for an
appellate court to review the weight given to
demeanor evidence by the trier of fact. The only
applicable rule is that the trier of fact may use
demeanor evidence; there are no rules limiting the
way in which it may be used. Judge Jerome Frank,
who wrote the [Dinon Coal Co.] opinion, commented:
'This lack of rules ('un-ruliness'), with its
concomitant wide discretion in the fact-trier, yields
inherent difficulties not surmountable by a reviewing
court, regardless of whether the fact-trier be a judge, ajury, or a trial examiner.' The court concluded, in
essence, that demeanor of witnesses is so significant
that it cannot be disregarded, but the nature of this
significance is so obscure that no rules can be
established for assessing such evidence. Thus, an
33. Id. at 43, quoting Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Dinon Coal Co., 201 F.2d
484, 487 (2d Cir. 1952).
34. Id.
element at the very center of the functioning of the
legal system is outside the law's control.35
In the hands of a jury, these determinations must be made, but
remain a mystery unless individual jurors elect to relate their
experiences after the trial. On the other hand, an AL' s evaluation of
witnesses' relative credibility is presented through the written report
of the adjudicator. If as O'Barr suggests, the process of making
credibility determinations is both "at the very center of the
functioning of the legal system" and at the same time "outside the
law's control" when performed by a jury or a judge in a bench trial,
then the administrative approach requiring a written articulation of
the factors that led to a rejection of one version of the facts over
another would seem to better serve the public interest.
E. In Conclusion: Key Factors that Should Help Determine the
Allocation of Authority to Render Adjudication as Between the AL]
and the Judicial Branch Judge
When lawmakers determine a legislative scheme should include
the adjudication of rights by an impartial decision-maker, a key
question must be whether the fact finder will be part of the
independent judicial branch of government or part of the executive
branch. As noted above, not all legislative schemes lend themselves
to the use of an ALJ, but for those schemes that implicate public
rights, some thought should be given to making an informed choice
of adjudicator.
A review of the studies of the use of language helps identify some
of the key factors to be considered when electing between a judicial
branch judge and an ALJ. These factors include: the relative need for
independent decision-making, the relative due process rights of
review, and the need for accountability in the decision-making
process.
35. Id. at 43-44 (quoting 201 F.2d at 490).
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1. The Relative Need for Independent Decisionmaking
The use of an independent judicial officer of the judicial branch
of government represents society's investment in the paramount form
of adjudication. Tested throughout our nation's history, the judicial
branch of government has proven its fierce determination to remain
unalterably committed to independence in the adjudicative process.
As a society, however, we have recognized the need to preserve our
limited judicial resources. Public rights may well be determined in
the first instance by executive-branch adjudicators, so as to conserve
judicial resources.
Not all decisions require the infrastructure of trials conducted in
the judicial branch. To the extent that a decision-making process
involves a check on governmental action, the administrative forum,
with its structured written reporting, may better serve both the
government, because of its efficiency and dispatch, and the governed,
because of its transparency.
2. Due Process and the Relative Rights of Review
As Judge Posner noted, although "the use of cost-benefit analysis
to determine due process is not to every constitutional scholar's or
judge's taste ... it is the analysis prescribed by the Supreme Court.
•,36 However, given that such an analysis is the law, lawmakers
should not feel constrained when considering adjudicative schemes to
not provide the full panoply of rights to all with claims concerning
public rights. "The due process clause is not a straightjacket,
preventing state governments from experimenting with more efficient
",37methods of delivering governmental services ....
Given the significant role of the spoken and written word in the
adjudicative process, a key consideration when designing a
legislative scheme involving public rights should be whether
enforcement of the law is better served with a written articulation of
the fact finder's rationale or without it. Along these same lines, the
choice must be made between using the independent judiciary as a
fact-finder of first instance, or to permit the findings of fact to be
36. Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1351 (7th Cir. 1997).
37 Id.
rendered while the matter is still within the original jurisdiction of the
agency, reserving independent judicial review until the executive
branch has exhausted its decision-making apparatus.
3. Accountability in the Decisionmaking Process
The ultimate consideration for governmental action, it would
seem, is whether the process will lead to results that not only are fair
but also appear to be fair to all who are exposed to the process.
Inextricably entwined in this notion of fairness is the expectation that
the adjudicator be accountable for her decision-making. The
requirement that the decision maker reduce the analysis of the case to
writing is a significant factor, and should be regarded as such when
crafting regulatory schemes. Also lending itself to greater
accountability is the requirement that the adjudicator maintain a
familiarity with the tools of effective communication: clear writing
skills, active listening skills, and the effective use of verbal and
nonverbal communication in controlling the process of gathering
evidence and rendering decisions. Procedural and presentational
styles make a difference, as O'Barr suggests in his evaluation of
linguistic evidence, and those differences can be exploited by making
an informed choice of adjudicators when creating legislative or
regulatory schemes. 38
38. O'Barr, supra note 6, at xii.
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